Abstract-Remote Data Checking (RDC) allows clients to efficiently check the integrity of data stored at untrusted servers. This allows data owners to assess the risk of outsourcing data in the cloud, making RDC a valuable tool for data auditing. A robust RDC scheme incorporates mechanisms to mitigate arbitrary amounts of data corruption. In particular, protection against small corruptions (i.e., bytes or even bits) ensures that attacks that modify a few bits do not destroy an encrypted file or invalidate authentication information. Early RDC schemes have focused on static data, whereas later schemes such as DPDP support the full range of dynamic operations on the outsourced data, including insertions, modifications, and deletions. Robustness is required for both static and dynamic RDC schemes that rely on spot checking for efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION Remote Data Checking (RDC) is a technique that allows
to check the integrity of data stored at a third party, such as a Cloud Storage Provider (CSP). Especially when the CSP is not fully trusted, RDC can be used for data auditing, allowing data owners to assess the risk of outsourcing data in the cloud.
In an RDC protocol, the data owner (client) initially stores data and metadata with the cloud storage provider (server); at a later time, an auditor (the data owner or another client) can challenge the server to prove that it can produce the data that was originally stored by the client; the server then generates a proof of data possession based on the data and the metadata. Several RDC schemes have been proposed, including Provable Data Possession (PDP) [1] , [2] and Proofs of Retrievability (PoR) [3] , [4] , both for the single server [1] , [3] , [4] and for the multiple server setting [5] - [8] .
Early RDC schemes have focused on static data, in which the client cannot modify the original data [1] , [3] , [4] or can only perform a limited set of updates [9] . Erway et al. [10] have proposed DPDP, a scheme that supports the full range of dynamic updates on the outsourced data, while providing the same strong guarantees about data integrity. The ability to perform updates such as insertions, modifications, or deletions, extends the applicability of RDC to practical systems for file storage [11] , [12] , database services [13] , peerto-peer storage [14] , [15] , and more complex cloud storage systems [16] , [17] .
A scheme for auditing remote data should be both lightweight and robust [2] . Lightweight means that it does not unduly burden the server; this includes both overhead (i.e., computation and I/O) at the server and communication between the server and the client. This goal can be achieved by relying on spot checking, in which the client randomly samples small portions of the data and checks their integrity, thus minimizing the I/O at the server. Spot checking allows the client to detect if a fraction of the data stored at the server has been corrupted, but it cannot detect corruption of small parts of the data (e.g., 1 byte).
Robust means that the auditing scheme incorporates mechanisms for mitigating arbitrary amounts of data corruption. Protecting against large corruptions ensures the CSP has committed the contracted storage resources: Little space can be reclaimed undetectably, making it unattractive to delete data to save on storage costs or sell the same storage multiple times. Protecting against small corruptions protects the data itself, not just the storage resource. Many data have value well beyond their storage costs, making attacks that corrupt small amounts of data practical. For example, modifying a single bit may destroy an encrypted file or invalidate authentication information. Thus, robustness is a necessary property for all RDC schemes that rely on spot checking, which includes the majority of static and dynamic RDC schemes.
Robustness is usually achieved by integrating forward errorcorrecting codes (FECs) with remote data checking [2] , [18] , [19] . Attacks that corrupt small amounts of data do no damage, because the corrupted data may be recovered by the FEC. Attacks that do unrecoverable amounts of damage are easily detected using spot checking, because they must corrupt many blocks of data to overcome the FEC redundancy. Unfortunately, under an adversarial setting, there is a fundamental tension between the dynamic nature of the updates supported in the DPDP scheme and FEC codes (which are mostly designed for static data) because securely updating even a small portion of the file may require retrieving the entire file.
In this paper, we make the following contributions: • We identify Reed-Solomon (RS) codes based on Cauchy matrices which provide communication-efficient code updates and propose methods to efficiently update the code parity under a benign setting (i.e., when the server is trustworthy). We observe that append/modify updates have a much lower bandwidth overhead than insert/delete updates (Section III-B).
• We identify the challenges that need to be overcome when trying to add robustness to a DPDP scheme in an adversarial setting (Section IV). Reed-Solomon codes provide efficient error correction capabilities in the static case, but their linear nature imposes a high communication cost when even a small portion of the original data needs to be updated (insertions/deletions). Moreover, it is difficult to hide the relationship among file symbols (required for robustness) while achieving a low communication overhead for updates.
• We give the definition of a Robust DPDP (R-DPDP) scheme, which is a remote data checking scheme that supports dynamic updates and at the same time provides robustness. We propose two R-DPDP constructions that realize this definition. The first one, πR-D, achieves robustness by extending techniques from the static to the dynamic setting.
The resulting R-DPDP scheme is efficient in encoding, but requires a high communication cost for updates (insertions/deletions). Our second construction, VLCG (Variable Length Constraint Group), overcomes this drawback by: (a) decoupling the encoding for robustness from the position of symbols in the file and instead relying on the value of symbols, and (b) reducing expensive insert/delete operations to append/modify operations when updating the RS-coded parity data, which ensures efficient updates even under an adversarial setting. The improvement provided by VLCG over πR-D is beneficial, as our source code analysis of a few popular software projects shows that insert/delete operations represent a majority of all updates (Section IV-C). Although DPDP schemes and robustness for the static RDC setting have been individually considered previously, we are the first to propose R-DPDP schemes that simultaneously provide robustness and support dynamic updates, while requiring small, constant, client storage. On the Adversarial Model. We work under the assumption that the cloud storage server is not trustworthy. Protection against corruption of a large portion of the data is necessary in order to handle servers that discard a significant fraction of the data. This applies to servers that are financially motivated to sell the same storage resource to multiple clients.
Protection against corruption of a small portion of the data is necessary in order to handle servers that try to hide data loss incidents. This applies to servers that wish to preserve their reputation. Data loss incidents may be accidental (e.g., management errors or hardware failures) or malicious (e.g., insider or outsider attacks).
Moreover, the storage server may try to provide a stale, older version of the data.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

A. Remote Data Checking (RDC)
Remote Data Checking (RDC) allows a client to check the integrity of data outsourced at an untrusted server, and thus to audit whether the server fulfills its contractual obligations. For simplicity, we assume the client's data is a file F.
A RDC protocol consists of three phases: Setup, Challenge and Retrieve. During Setup, the data owner preprocesses the file F generating metadata Σ, and then stores both F and Σ at the server. The data owner deletes F and Σ from its local storage and only keeps a small amount of secret key material K (constant client storage). During Challenge, an auditor (the data owner or another client) challenges the server to prove that it can produce the data that was originally stored. The server produces a proof of data possession based on the data and the metadata. The client uses the secret key material K to check the validity of the proof provided by the server. During the Retrieve phase, the data owner recovers the original data. Depending on how robustness is added to RDC, recovering the data can be as simple as retrieving the original file or using the redundancy provided by error correction to compensate for small data corruption.
B. Remote Data Checking for Dynamic Settings
Early RDC schemes have focused on static data, in which the client cannot modify the original data [1] , [3] , [4] or can only perform a limited set of updates [9] .
Dynamic Provable Data Possession (DPDP) [10] proposes a model that provides strong guarantees about data integrity while supporting the full range of dynamic operations on the outsourced data, including modifications, insertions, deletions, and appends. A DPDP protocol contains the three phases as in an RDC protocol for static data (Setup, Challenge, and Retrieve), but also allows another phase, Update. During Update, the original file may be updated. During Challenge, the auditor obtains an integrity guarantee about the latest file version (due to updates, this may be different from the original file). In Retrieve, the client recovers the latest version of the file. As opposed to handling static data, the main challenge in DPDP is ensuring that the client obtains guarantees about the latest version of the file (i.e., prevent the server from passing the client's challenges by using old file versions) while meeting the low overhead requirements for RDC.
A DPDP scheme is a collection of seven polynomialtime algorithms (KeyGen DPDP, PrepareUpdate DPDP, PerformUpdate DPDP, VerifyUpdate DPDP, GenChallenge DPDP, Prove DPDP, Verify DPDP). For the complete definition of a DPDP scheme, we refer the reader to [10] . We note that DPDP does not include provisions for robustness.
Dynamic Proofs of Retrievability. Concurrently with our work, Stefanov et al. [20] proposed Iris, a system that supports dynamic proofs of retrievability (D-PoR), including protection against small data corruption. For practical reasons, Iris achieves robustness by storing the parity data on the client. As this may place an additional burden on lightweight clients, our work focuses on a more challenging setting which has stood as an open problem: All data, including parity, is stored at the server, in order to minimize client storage.
Another proposal for D-PoR [21] does not offer protection against small data corruption when clients rely on spot checking data stored at untrusted servers.
Authenticated Data Structures. In all the DPDP and D-PoR constructions, the client uses an authenticated data structure to ensure the freshness of the retrieved file and to prevent the server from using an old file version when answering challenges. This data structure is usually a tree-like structure computed over the verification tags, and the client keeps a copy of the root of this structure (e.g., skip lists [10] , RSA trees [10] , Merkle hash trees [20] , [22] , or 2-3 trees [21] ). Our work can rely on any of these data structures to ensure file data freshness and prevent replay attacks from the server.
C. Error-correcting codes
We say that a code C is a (n, k, d + 1) error-correcting code if it encodes a message of k symbols into a codeword of n symbols and has minimum distance d + 1. The minimum distance d + 1 is the minimum Hamming distance between any two distinct codewords of C and reflects the code's ability to handle errors. We will use Reed-Solomon [23] (RS) codes which are Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) codes (i.e., can tolerate as many erasures as their overhead, e.g., n − k). We use the notation (n, k) RS code to denote a RS code that can correct up to d = n − k erasures.
For data checking protocols, we are concerned with erasure correction not error correction. The integrity of data is independently verifiable, e.g., through verification tags in PDP [1] . Any data error will be detected and the erroneous data will be omitted, converting an error into an erasure.
We consider systematic forward error-correcting (FEC) codes, which are codes that embed the unmodified input in the encoded output (e.g., the first k symbols of a codeword are the same k original symbols). We refer to the redundant symbols in the codeword as parity symbols.
D. Robust Auditing of Outsourced Data
A robust auditing scheme incorporates mechanisms for mitigating arbitrary amounts of data corruption. We consider a notion of mitigation that includes the ability to both efficiently detect data corruption and be impervious to data corruption. When data corruption is detected, the owner can act in a timely fashion (e.g., data can be restored from other replicas). Even when data corruption is not detected, a robust auditing scheme ensures that no data will be lost. More formally, we define a robust auditing scheme as follows [2] : Definition 2.1: A robust auditing scheme RA is a tuple (C, T ), where C is a remote data checking scheme for a file F and T is a transformation that yieldsF when applied on F. We say RA provides δ-robustness when: the auditor will detect with high probability if the server corrupts more than a δ-fraction ofF (protection against corruption of a large portion ofF) the auditor will recover the data in F with high probability if the server corrupts at most a δ-fraction ofF (protection against corruption of a small portion ofF) Several methods can be employed to add robustness to a remote data checking scheme [2] , [18] . The most straightforward method is to use an FEC code over the entire file. For a file of f symbols, this can be achieved with an (n, f ) ReedSolomon code and would give an even stronger guarantee than δ-robustness, because this code can deterministically correct up to n − f erasures and not just with high probability. However, such an FEC code would be impractical because RS codes become quite inefficient to compute even for moderatesize files if the code were to be applied over the entire file.
For efficiency reasons, it is desirable to apply a RS code over a smaller number of symbols: the file F is divided into ksymbol chunks and a (n, k) RS code is applied to each chunk, expanding it into a n-symbol codeword. The first k symbols of the codeword are the original k data symbols, followed by d = n − k parity symbols. We define a constraint group as the group of symbols from the same codeword, i.e., the original k data symbols and their corresponding n − k parity symbols. The number of constraint groups in the encoded file is the same as the number of chunks in the original file, namely,
To ensure the δ-robustness guarantee, it is necessary that the association between symbols and constraint groups remain hidden (i.e., the server should not know which symbols belong to the same constraint group). This can be achieved through a combination of permuting and then encrypting the symbols of the file. Different encoding schemes to add robustness can lead to remote data checking schemes with different properties and performance characteristics [2] , [3] , [18] , [19] . We refer the reader to two such schemes [2] , [18] : πA (Permute-All) and πR (Permute-Redundancy). When compared to πA, πR is more efficient (as it requires to permute and encrypt only the parity symbols) and preserves the systematic nature of the RS code. πR was shown to achieve the δ-robustness guarantee [18] , [19] (this construction is also known as a "server code" in the literature [6] , [19] ).
III. PRELIMINARIES
Towards achieving robustness, in this section we first review Reed-Solomon encoding and decoding based on Cauchy matrices. We then study how to update a Reed-Solomon code when an update is applied to the original data. Note that in this section we study these operations under a benign setting (i.e., when the server is trustworthy).
We consider a (n, k) Reed-Solomon (RS) code that can correct up to d = n − k known erasures or To encode a k-symbol message into a n-symbol codeword, we need a n * k encoding matrix, known as the distribution matrix. Typically, Vandermonde or Cauchy matrices are used to construct the distribution matrix. We use Cauchy RS codes, which are Reed-Solomon codes based on Cauchy matrices [24] , for two reasons: they are more suitable to handle dynamic operations on the original data (as we show in Sec. III-B) and they were shown to be approximately twice as fast as the classical Reed-Solomon encoding based on Vandermonde matrices [25] - [28] .
A. Cauchy RS Encoding and Decoding
For ease of presentation, we present the Cauchy RS encoding and decoding using a (6,4) RS code as an example (i.e., n = 6, k = 4, d = 2). All the arithmetic operations are in GF (2 w ), assuming the condition 2 w >n always holds (the +, − operations can be regarded as ⊕, logical XOR). We use L T to denote the transpose of a vector L.
Encode. The message L contains 4 data symbols, all of which are in the Galois Field GF (2 w ):
. We use the method introduced in [29] to construct the Cauchy matrix, which has the useful property that it can be re-generated on the fly based on a constant amount of information. The distribution matrix M 1 , which is composed of the identity matrix in the first 4 rows and Cauchy matrix in the remaining 2 rows, is as follows:
The codeword C is computed as
where the parity symbols p 1 and p 2 are
Decode. When using a (6, 4) RS code, any 4 out of 6 symbols are enough to recover L. Assume that b 3 and b 4 are corrupted. To recover L, the decoding process is:
The decoding matrix, M , is invertible based on the fact that all of the 4 * 4 submatrices of M 1 are invertible [30] . Moreover, M has the useful property that it can be re-generated by knowing the indices of the non-corrupted symbols in the codeword. By putting the non-corrupted symbols into their right locations in the codeword for decoding, M can be regenerated based on a constant amount of information.
B. Cauchy RS Updating
Consider a (n, k) Cauchy RS code computed over a message. If the symbols in the original message are updated (e.g., modified, appended, inserted, deleted), we are interested to update the RS parity data so that it reflects the updated message. We seek to answer the question: how can we minimize the cost of updating the RS code? More precisely, how can we update the parity symbols efficiently by minimizing the number of symbols that need to be read from the orginal RS code? 1 . We answer this question using the same example from Sec. III-A. The conclusion is that modify/append operations have a lower bandwidth overhead than insert/delete operations.
Modify a data symbol. For example, if symbol b 1 is modified to b 1 , we should update the parity data correspondingly: p 1 is updated to p 1 , and p 2 is updated to p 2 . To compute p 1 and p 2 , only the old parity symbols (p 1 , p 2 ) and the old data symbol (b 1 ) are required to be retrieved (i.e., there is no need to retrieve any other data symbol except the one to be modified):
Append a data symbol. For example, if b 5 is appended to L, to maintain the same fault tolerance level, the (6, 4) RS code should become a (7, 5) RS code and the new distribution matrix M 2 is (assuming the condition 2 w >n still holds): 
Compared to M 1 , most of the elements in M 2 are the same although n has changed (this is a useful property of Cauchy RS codes). To update the parity data correspondingly, only the old parity symbols (p 1 , p 2 ) are required to be retrieved (i.e., there is no need to retrieve any of the data symbols):
Insert a data symbol. For example, if b 2 is inserted into L after b 2 , to maintain the same fault tolerance level, the (6, 4) RS code should become a (7, 5) RS code. The new distribution matrix will be M 2 , thus, we can update the parity data (p 1 to p 1 , p 2 to p 2 ) by retrieving whichever one is smaller between: 
• D is the encoded file, F is the original file, P is the redundancy added after applying a RS code over F. We have D = F||P.
• n is the number of symbols in a constraint group:
where k is the number of data symbols and d is the number of parity symbols. A (n, k) RS code is applied over each constraint group.
• M is the server metadata computed over D (stored at the server, includes the verification tags).
• F i is the i-th version of F. We have D i = F i ||P i and M i is the server metadata for D i .
• Mc is the client metadata (e.g., the root of the skip list/RSA tree [10] ).
• inf o is the information about the update operation (e.g., full rewrite, delete block i, modify block i, insert a block after block i, etc.).
Fig. 1: Reference sheet for various notations.
Delete a data symbol. Similar to inserting a data symbol, to update the parity when deleting the i-th symbol from L, we need to retrieve the smaller between either all the data symbols, or all the parity symbols and the data symbols after position i.
IV. ROBUST DYNAMIC PROVABLE DATA POSSESSION SCHEMES
In this section, we present R-DPDP, a new framework to add robustness to DPDP. R-DPDP allows to audit remote data that is dynamically changing and, at the same time, offers protection against both large and small data corruption. To the best of our knowledge, robustness has not been previously considered for dynamic remote data checking while maintaining small, constant, client storage.
We start by summarizing the challenges that need to be overcome when adding robustness to DPDP. We then present the definition of a R-DPDP scheme and propose two R-DPDP constructions: πR-D (an extension of the πR scheme presented in Sec. II-D) and VLCG (Variable Length Constraint Group, a new scheme that improves the communication efficiency of πR-D in the Update phase). To facilitate the exposition, we include a reference sheet with various notations in Fig. 1 .
Challenges. It is challenging to add robustness to DPDP in an adversarial setting and also maintain low bandwidth overhead for updates, because:
• Adding robustness to DPDP requires encoding the data using Reed-Solomon codes. RS codes, as a type of linear codes, provide error correction in a static setting, as they compute redundancy over every portion of the original data. However, they are not immediately suitable when the data can be dynamically updated. As shown in Sec. III-B, for certain update operations (insert/delete), updating even a small portion of the original data imposes a high communication cost (this holds even under a benign setting, in which the server is trustworthy).
• Robustness applies RS encoding over groups of symbols (constraint groups) and it requires to hide the association between symbols and constraint groups (i.e., the server should not know which symbols belong to the same constraint group). When dynamic updates are performed over file data, the parity of the affected constraint groups should also be updated, which requires knowledge of the data and the parity symbols in those constraint groups (Sec. III-B). However, the client cannot simply retrieve only the symbols of the affected constraint groups, as that would reveal the contents of the corresponding constraint groups and break robustness. Moreover, the client cannot simply update only the parity symbols in the affected constraint groups, as that may allow the server to infer which parity symbols are in the same constraint group by comparing the new parity with the old parity.
File representation. We use two independent logical representation of the file for different purposes: For the purpose of file updating (during the Update phase), the file is seen as an ordered collection of blocks. Basically, update operations occur at the block level. This is also the representation used for checking data possession (during the Challenge phase), as each block has one corresponding verification tag.
For the purpose of encoding for robustness, the file is seen as a collection of symbols, which are grouped into constraint groups and each constraint group is encoded independently.
For each file block, there is a corresponding verification tag which needs to be stored at the server. Thus, larger file blocks result in smaller additional server storage overhead due to verification tags. On the other hand, efficient encoding and decoding requires the symbols to be from a small size field. As a result, one file block will usually contain multiple symbols. Each file update operation which is performed at the block level results into several operations applied to the symbols in that block (for example, when modifying a data block, all the symbols in that block and the corresponding parity symbols should be modified). 
A. R-DPDP Definition
We introduce the definition of a robust dynamic data possession (R-DPDP) scheme. Compared to a DPDP scheme, R-DPDP adds robustness, which is reflected in slightly different definitions for the data-updating algorithms. We have also added an explicit algorithm to decode the data, since data decoding is more challenging when robustness is needed. We advise readers familiar with the definition of DPDP to skip this section and continue with Section IV-B.
Definition 4.1: (R-DPDP SCHEME) A Robust Dynamic Provable Data Possession (R-DPDP) scheme is a collection of eight polynomial-time algorithms:
• KeyGen(1 κ ) → {sk, pk}: a probabilistic key generation algorithm run by the client to setup the scheme. Input: the security parameter κ. Output: the secret key sk and public key pk.
• PrepareUpdate(sk, pk, ΔF, ΔD i−1 , info, M c ) → {e(ΔD), e(inf o ), e(ΔM )}: an algorithm run by the client to prepare (a part of) the file for untrusted storage. Input: the secret key sk, the public key pk, (a part of) the file ΔF , (a part of) the previous version of the encoded file ΔD i−1 , information about the update operation inf o, and the client metadata M c . Output: the "encoded" version of the update data e(ΔD) (add to ΔD randomness, sentinels, or simply let e(Δ(D)) = ΔD. ΔD is the data to be updated), the "encoded" version of the update information e(inf o ) (inf o will be changed to inf o , since updating ΔF may lead to updating of the redundancy. inf o should be changed to fit the encoded version of ΔD), and the new server metadata e(ΔM ). The client will send e(ΔD), e(inf o ), and e(ΔM ) to the server.
• PerformUpdate(pk, • VerifyUpdate(sk, pk, ΔF,
an algorithm run by the client to verify the server's behavior during the update. Input: all the inputs from PrepareUpdate, M c and the proof P M c which are sent back by the server. Output: accept if the check succeeds, reject otherwise.
• GenChallenge(sk, pk, M c ) → {c}: a probabilistic algorithm run by the client to issue a challenge for the server. Input: the secret key sk, public key pk, and the latest client metadata M c . Output: the challenge c that will be sent to the server.
• Prove(pk, D i , M i , c) → {Π}: an algorithm run by the server to generate the proof of possession upon receiving the challenge from the client. Input: the public key pk, the latest version of the encoded file D i , the metadata M i , and the challenge c. Output: a proof of possession Π that will be sent back to the client.
• Verify(sk, pk, M c , c, Π) → {accept, reject}: an algorithm run by the client to validate a proof of possession upon receiving the proof Π from the server. Input: the secret key sk, the public key pk, the client metadata M c , the challenge c, and the proof Π. Output: accept if Π is a valid proof of possession, reject otherwise. 
inf o, M c ). C sends e(ΔD), e(inf o ), e(ΔM ) to S. S runs
{D i , M i , M c , P M c } ← PerformUpdate(pk, D i−1 , M i−1 , e
(ΔD), e(inf o ), e(ΔM )) and sends M c , P M
B. Enhancing πR: πR-D
We first describe πR-D, a new scheme obtained by adapting the πR scheme to add robustness on top of a DPDP scheme (for the detailed description of πR, refer to the extended technical report [31] ). In the Setup phase, the file F is first processed according to πR, and the parity data P is generated. The encoded file D = F||P is then pre-processed further using the DPDP algorithms PrepareUpdate DPDP, PerformUpdate DPDP, and VerifyUpdate DPDP. During the Challenge phase, we can use directly the DPDP algorithms GenChallenge DPDP, Prove DPDP, and Verify DPDP.
In the Update phase, the main operations are:
• Insert/Delete a data block. A data block may contain multiple symbols, which may belong to more than one constraint groups. Inserting/deleting a data block is equivalent to inserting/deleting all the symbols in that block. Inserting/deleting a data symbol will affect the indices of the following data symbols in the whole file, as well as the parameter f of the PRP ψ in πR. Since in πR the contents of each constraint group are decided based on the indices provided by the PRP ψ, the changing of the parameter f of PRP ψ will require the client to download the entire file F and re-compute the parity P based on a new set of constraint groups. The update bandwidth factor is α = |F| |D| .
The updated file F is pre-processed using the technique described in πR, but the new parity P will be permuted and encrypted by a new key (the client will only keep the new key and discard the previous key). For an insert operation, the newly inserted block is sent back to the server using the corresponding DPDP update algorithms, whereas for a delete operation the corresponding block should be deleted. Also, P should replace the old parity at the server.
• Modify a data block. The client downloads the data block to be modified (i.e., the old data block) and the latest version of the parity P, decrypts P and restores the original order, updates the parity symbols in the affected constraint groups according to P, the data symbols in the old and the new data block (exact procedure described in Sec. III-B). The update bandwidth factor is α = |P| |D| . To prevent the server from learning the contents of the constraint groups by comparing the new parity with the old parity, the client should use a new key to permute and encrypt the parity symbols (the client will keep the new key and discard the previous key). The new data block and the new parity P are sent back to the server using the DPDP update algorithms, replacing the corresponding old block and old P. In the Retrieve phase, the client simply retrieves the file F and may use the parity P to correct data corruption.
Performance analysis. πR-D is efficient during Setup and Retrieve, but has high communication overhead during
Update, since for every insertion/deletion the update bandwidth factor is α = |F| |D| , which approaches 1 in practice. We have analyzed the pattern of updates for the source files of two popular projects (OpenSSL [32] and Eclipse [33] ) and found that the number of insert and delete operations, compared to modifications, represent a majority of the total number of updates (detailed statistics are available in the extended technical report [31] ). Thus, it is likely that one small update may require to download the entire file F. We need a scheme with lower communication overhead for data updates.
Security analysis. The δ-robustness of the πR-D scheme can be established similarly as for the πR scheme [2] : Once we fix a target for the probability of a successful attack (e.g.,
10
−10 ), we can determine the RS encoding parameters that minimize the number of blocks being spot-checked during a challenge. The resulting RS encoding provides the value of δ. If the adversary corrupts more than a δ-fraction of the encoded file, the spot-checking based strategy and the authentication structure of the underlying DPDP scheme guarantee that the auditor can detect such corruptions with high probability. If the adversary corrupts at most a δ-fraction, the data can be retrieved based on the recovery capability of the RS code.
C. Variable Length Constraint Group
Though efficient in encoding, πR-D has a high communication overhead for updates. In πR-D, the PRP ψ is applied to the index of data symbols, thus making it sensitive to insert/delete operations (e.g., one simple insertion/deletion may require the client to download the entire file F).
To mitigate the drawbacks of πR-D, we propose a second construction called Variable Length Constraint Group (VLCG). Like in πR-D,
we still use the notion of constraint groups, which are groups of symbols over which a RS code is computed. However, we rely on two additional main insights.
Firstly, unlike in πR-D, in which symbols are assigned to constrained groups based on the position (i.e., index) of the symbols in the file, VLCG assigns symbols to constraint groups based on the value of the symbols. More precisely, for a data symbol b, we use h K (b) to decide the index of the constraint group to which b belongs. This has the advantage that, in order to insert/delete a data symbol into/from f , we can insert/delete the data symbol into/from the corresponding constraint group, without affecting other constraint groups.
Secondly, we employ several techniques to preserve robustness and minimize the bandwidth overhead. For example, we reduce insert operations to append operations and delete operations to modify operations when updating the RS-coded parity data.
We seek to maintain the same fault tolerance level (see definition in Sec. III-A) for all constraint groups (that is, for every (n, k) constraint group, d = n − k will be kept the same after each update operation). All the parity symbols P should be permuted like in πR, but there is no need to encrypt them (this is explained later in more detail).
Next, we give an overview of the VLCG construction, focusing on the Update and Retrieve phases.
Update operations. For all update operations, we first execute the actual block update on the file data, but the challenging step is how to efficiently update the RS-coded parity data.
Inserting a symbol into the file requires updating the parity symbols of the constraint group to which the symbol is assigned. According to the analysis in Sec. III-B, inserting a symbol into a RS code (equivalent to inserting it into a constraint group) requires to retrieve either all the data symbols in that constraint group, or all the parity symbols and some of the data symbols in that constraint group. However, as we argued for the πR scheme (Sec. II-D), to ensure the δ-robustness guarantee, it is necessary that the association between symbols and constraint groups remains hidden. Thus, it is insufficient to only retrieve symbols from the corresponding constraint group. Moreover, it is not possible to efficiently determine which other symbols belong to that constraint group. For these reasons, the client would have to retrieve the entire file F. We overcome this limitation by updating the parity symbols of the symbol's constraint group as if the symbol was appended to the end of the data symbols in that constraint group (of course, the symbol is still inserted in the file at the desired location). The advantage of this method is that appending a data symbol to a Cauchy RS code does not require to download any data symbols and we can update the corresponding parity symbols based only on the old parity (cf. Sec. III-B). We note that ensuring δ-robustness prevents us from retrieving only the parity symbols from this constraint group. Instead, we retrieve all the parity data P. Thus the update bandwidth factor is α = |P| |D| . Deleting a data symbol is more complex. Although under a benign setting this operation could be achieved by only retrieving symbols from the same constraint group, ensuring δ-robustness prevents us from using this strategy. Instead, we use a different strategy: to delete a data symbol, we ask the server to physically delete the symbol from F, but we update the parity symbols from the corresponding constraint group as if that symbol was modified to have the value 0. As a result, the delete operation is converted into a modify operation when updating the RS-encoded parity data for the corresponding constraint group (a similar strategy was previously used in [7] , [9] ). A code modify operation, according to Sec. III-B, only requires to download the parity data and the old symbol from the corresponding constraint group. This means that the update bandwidth factor can be kept as α = |P| |D| for deletion. Modifying a data symbol is the most complex operation because if a symbol is modified to a new different value, it may be re-assigned to a different constraint group. The old symbol must first be deleted from its current constraint group and the new symbol must be inserted into a (possibly) new constraint group. The update bandwidth factor remains α = |P| |D| . In the extended tech report [31] we propose an alternative method to optimize the communication overhead for updates (α = log 2 |P| |D| ) by using Oblivious RAMs to only retrieve the parity symbols from the corresponding constraint groups.
Retrieve data. The method we use for deciding to which constraint group does a symbol belong in VLCG introduces an additional challenge in the Retrieve phase. By using a PRF over the value of the symbol to decide its constraint group, the encoded file contains no information about the relative position of the symbols inside a constraint group. Note that the initial position of the symbols inside a constraint group may change because of update operations (i.e., modification of symbols). In case of data corruption, the RS code computed over a constraint group will be used to recover the original symbols; however, successfully decoding the RS code requires knowledge of the correct position of symbols inside the constraint group. During file recovery, the correct position of symbols inside a constraint group may be uncertain because of two reasons: (a) if a symbol is corrupted, the client does not know to which constraint group did that symbol belong, and thus the symbol will be missing from that constraint group during RS decoding; (b) if a symbol is deleted (i.e., a valid delete operation), it does not exist anymore at the server (i.e., we cannot find this symbol in the latest file version), but for RS decoding purposes the client should still use a symbol with value 0 at the corresponding position in the constraint group to which the symbol belongs.
We illustrate the uncertainty in decoding with an example. Assume that a constraint group is a (6, 4) RS code (b 1 b 2 b 3 b 4 p 1 p 2 ). If b 3 was corrupted, the RS decoding should take as input (b 1 b 2 ? b 4 p 1 p 2 ) , whereas if b 3 was deleted, the input for RS decoding should be (b 1 b 2 0 b 4 p 1 p 2 ) . But how does the client know that in position 3 there should be a corrupted symbol or a 0 symbol?
To deal with the uncertainty about symbol position in a constraint group during decoding, we propose a strategy similar with the one used in HAIL [6] : to identify the correct locations of data symbols (healthy and 0 symbols) in their corresponding constraint groups, we convert the parity symbols into cryptographically secure Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Based on these MACs, we use a brute force approach to determine the correct position of symbols for RS decoding (full details in Fig. 2) . The parity symbols are converted to secure MACs by composing them with a pseudorandom function (PRF) (we call this operation masking). The PRF is computed over the file identifier, the index of the corresponding constraint group, and the index of the parity symbol in the constraint group. For example, using the (6,4) RS code described in Sec. III-A, the new parity symbols p 1 and p 2 , which are also secure MACs over 4 , are computed as:
where g is a PRF and all operations are over GF (2 w ), in which "+" and "−" can be regarded as bitwise XORs. To strip off g from p 1 and p 2 , we compute:
Since different constraint groups may end up having different sizes, the client needs to keep track of the size of each constraint group 2 . This can be done by recording either n or k for each (n, k) RS code (because d = n − k is fixed for all constraint groups). Let Φ be the set of (n, k) parameters for all constraint groups. For ease of presentation, we assume that Φ is stored (and updated) at the client. In Sec. IV-D we discuss how to store Φ more efficiently.
Finally, we note that since the parity symbols are masked with a PRF, there is no need to further encrypt them as in step 3 of the πR construction (detailed description of πR in [31] ).
1) The VLCG construction: We are now ready to present the details of our main R-DPDP construction, Variable Length Constraint Group (VLCG). We fix the parameters n and k as the initial size of the RS code computed over each constraint group of k data symbols and let d = n − k be the fault tolerance level of the code. For a file with f symbols F = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b f }, there will be m = f/k constraint groups and each constraint group will initially have approximately n symbols (k data and d parity symbols). As file updates are performed, the (n, k) parameters for different constraint groups will change, but the fault tolerance level d = n − k will be preserved. Each file symbol is an element in the Galois Field GF (2 w ). Let κ be a security parameter. In addition, we make use of a pseudo-random permutation (PRP) ϕ and two pseudo-random functions (PRF) h and g with the following parameters:
w Figures 2 and 3 describe our VLCG construction, which can be built on top of any DPDP scheme DPDP = (KeyGen DPDP, PrepareUpdate DPDP, PerformUpdate DPDP, VerifyUpdate DPDP, GenChallenge DPDP, Prove DPDP, Verify DPDP) (refer to [10] for the definition of a DPDP scheme). We construct a R-DPDP protocol from the VLCG scheme in four phases Setup, Challenge, Update, and Retrieve as follows.
Setup. The client C runs {sk, pk} ← KeyGen(1 κ ), and then runs PrepareUpdate on the file F. PrepareUpdate applies the PRF h over every symbol in F, determining the group where each symbol is assigned to (there are m groups). For every group of k symbols (k may be different for different groups, depending on how many symbols are assigned to the groups), PrepareUpdate applies a (n = k + d, k) RS code and every group becomes a (n, k) constraint group. The md parity symbols from all the constraint groups will form the parity data P. All the symbols in P are masked using PRF g and permuted using PRP ϕ, both keyed with key K (similar as in πR). PrepareUpdate then calls the PrepareUpdate DPDP algorithm of DPDP to further process D = F||P.
The output of PrepareUpdate is sent to the server S. S runs PerformUpdate to fully re-write the data (D and the corresponding verification tags in M ) and sends back the proof. C verifies the proof by running VerifyUpdate. If the verification is successful, C discards D and M , and keeps all the (n, k) parameters; otherwise, C quits the protocol and retries with a different server.
Challenge. As described in Section IV-A, the client challenges the server to prove data possession using the GenChallenge, Prove, and Verify algorithms which simply call their counterpart algorithms of DPDP.
Update. Three operations are available in the Update phase: insert, delete, and modify a data block.
Insert a data block B. After having downloaded the whole file parity P i−1 (i.e., ΔD i−1 = P i−1 ), C runs PrepareUpdate. C first restores the original order of the parity symbols in P i−1 and then strips off PRF g from them. For each symbol b in B, C updates the constraint group with index h K (b) by appending b to the data symbols of the constraint group (cf. Sec. III-B). C obtains P i by using PRF g to mask all the symbols in the file parity P and by using PRP ϕ to permute them (g and ϕ are keyed with a new key K ). PrepareUpdate then calls the PrepareUpdate DPDP algorithm of DPDP to further process the data P i ||B. The output of PrepareUpdate is sent to S. S runs PerformUpdate and sends back the proof for updating the corresponding data correctly. C then runs VerifyUpdate to check the proof. If successful, C discards P i−1 , B, and the old key K , and updates the (n, k) parameters for the corresponding constraint groups to (n + 1, k + 1); otherwise, C aborts the protocol and raises an alarm.
Delete a data block B . After having downloaded the whole parity data P i−1 and the block B that is to be deleted (i.e., PRP ϕ, both with a new key K (the previous K will be discarded after having verified the update successfully) 6. Return Pi Fig. 3 : Computing the parity symbols in VLCG key K ). PrepareUpdate then calls the PrepareUpdate DPDP algorithm of DPDP to further process P i . The output of PrepareUpdate is sent to S. PerformUpdate and VerifyUpdate are run just like in the insert a block operation above, except that there is no need to update the (n, k) parameters after C verifies the update successfully.
Modify a data block B to B. Modifying a data block B to B is equivalent to first deleting the old block B and then inserting the new block B.
For each of these operations (insert, delete, modify a block), the client discards the previous key K after running VerifyUpdate and replaces it with the new K . Thus, C only stores a constant amount of key material. The Decode algorithm relies on brute force decoding to recover the file (VLCG can tolerate up to d − 1 erasures in each constraint group). We argue this is not a major concern because, first of all, file recovery is usually a rare event; secondly, in [31] we present an optimization that tradesoff client computation during decoding for additional server storage. We also note that during Decoding, verification tags are used to determine the healthy data blocks and only symbols in healthy data blocks are assigned to their constraint groups (thus, if the server swaps two symbols in the data file, the corresponding blocks will be considered corrupted).
D. Discussion
Unlike πR-D in which all the constraint groups have the same fixed size, in VLCG the length of each constraint group is variable. The client can determine which symbols belong to the same constraint group by keeping track of the set Φ of (n, k) parameters for all the constraint groups. A basic approach is to store Φ at the client, which will result in O(m) additional client storage. An alternative approach is to store Φ at the server and securely manage it using a Merkle hash tree; the client only stores the root of the tree, thus preserving the O(1) client storage overhead; the communication overhead is increased by O(m) during challenges of data possession, and by O(log m) during updates.
The number k of data symbols in a constraint group should be kept relatively small, so that the (n, k) RS code can be computed efficiently over the constraint group. Once the n and k parameters are fixed, the number of constraint groups m is determined as m = f/k. As updates are performed, m remains the same, but the number of data symbols k in each constraint groups may change (though the level of fault tolerance d = n − k is preserved). Since delete operations do not reduce the size of the (n, k) RS code, k will increase over time due to insert/modify operations. To avoid a prohibitive increase of k and keep the (n, k) RS codes efficient to compute, as well as keep the zero symbols as few as possible (to keep the brute force computation in the Decode algorithm at a minimum), the client C should periodically perform a dynamic adjustment: after a certain number of updates C retrieves the file and runs Setup to pre-process the file again; in this process, C may pick a different m, depending on the size of the updated file. The amortized bandwidth factor for updates will remain α = |P| |D| . We now describe one step that was previously omitted to simplify the description of the VLCG scheme. The assignment of data symbols to constraint groups is done based on the value of each symbol. To ensure robustness, the server should not know which symbols belong to the same constraint group. The client applies a layer of encryption before storing the file at the server in order to hide that two equal symbols are mapped to the same constraint group. Specifically, in the Setup phase, the succession of steps for the client is: (1) encode the file and obtain the parity, (2) encrypt the file blocks (using randomized encryption), (3) mask and permute the parity, (4) generate verification metadata over the encrypted file and parity, (5) store the encrypted file, parity, and metadata at the server. As a result, the client needs to remove this encryption layer whenever it gets file data from the server, and add the encryption whenever it stores blocks at the server.
Finally, we remark that our VLCG construction is better suited for files with random data in order to ensure that PRF h provides a balanced distribution of symbols into constraint groups. For instance, files could be encrypted before applying the PRF, and then be stored encrypted at the server (this may be desirable anyway if the data is of sensitive nature).
Security analysis for VLCG. The main difference between VLCG and πR-D in the Setup phase is that VLCG determines the constraint groups by applying a PRF over the content of data symbols, whereas πR-D determines them by applying a PRF over the indices of the data symbols. The security properties of the PRF used to decide the constraint groups and of the randomized encryption applied on the file data before being stored at the server, ensure that the server can infer which symbols are in the same constraint group with negligible probability. Moreover, VLCG masks and permutes the parity in a similar fashion with the permuting and encrypting of the parity in πR-D, ensuring a similar δ-robustness guarantee as for πR-D (see security analysis for πR-D).
The security of the Challenge and Update phases in VLCG relies on the security of the underlying DPDP scheme (which ensures that large corruptions will be detected based on spotchecking and that the server possesses the latest version of the file based on the authenticated structure).
In the Update phase, for insert/delete operations, VLCG only downloads the parity, updates the corresponding parity symbols, then re-masks and re-permutes the parity with a new key, which is comparative to πR-D, in which although the whole file data is downloaded (for the purpose of re-computing the parity), only the newly generated parity is re-permuted and re-encrypted with a new key; for modify operations, both VLCG and πR-D only download the parity (rather than the whole file data) and update the parity correspondingly. In the Retrieve phase, both schemes rely on the same mechanisms (metadata and authenticated data structure) to detect corruption. This implies that VLCG and πR-D provide a similar security level. We leave a rigorous security analysis of VLCG as future work.
Performance analysis for VLCG. For every update operation (insertion, deletion, and modification), the update bandwidth factor α for VLCG is approximately The extended technical report [31] provides additional details about the performance of VLCG: We show that the encoding computation for VLCG is close to that of πR-D; we also provide optimizations for the Decode algorithm in VLCG and for the communication cost of updates in VLCG.
V. CONCLUSION
Adding protection against small corruptions to remote data checking schemes that support dynamic updates extends the range of applications that rely on outsourcing data at untrusted servers. In this paper, we have proposed the first Robust Dynamic Provable Data Possession (R-DPDP) schemes that provide robustness and, at the same time, support dynamic data updates, while requiring small, constant, client storage. The main challenge that had to be overcome was to reduce the client-server communication overhead during updates under an adversarial setting. This work initiates the study of R-DPDP schemes, but more investigation is required in order to improve the efficiency of our VLCG construction (such as further reducing the update bandwidth factor and the computation required by the brute force search during data retrieval).
